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by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
At a time when, alas, economist jokes are 
in vogue, I would like to add my favorite 
wisecrack about our profession: if all the 
economists in the world were laid end to 
end, it might be a good thing. This sour 
remark is instigated by my having to listen 
to, and occasionally participate in, what 
seem to be endless debates on whether 
budget deficits really matter, and, if so, on 
what arcane basis of measurement. I finally 
have found a short cut that reconciles the 
great intellectual wisdom of our profession 
with the practical concerns of participants 
in and observers of financial markets. Thus, 
I conclude that deficits do not matter-but 
that Treasury borrowing and money creation 
surely do! 
Having disposed of this weighty subject 
so quickly, let me go on to examine several 
current policy questions relating to federal 
finance and to budget deficits. First, let us 
consider the nature of the changes made in 
federal outlays by the Reagan Administration 
and, second, let us analyze some of the 
economic implications, covering both mili-
tary and civilian programs. This task, it 
turns out, is more complicated than one 
might expect. 
How Much Has the Budget Been Cut? 
To begin, it is difficult to directly 
compare the current estimates of outlays 
under the Reagan program with those 
contained in President Carter's last budget 
message, presented in January, 1981. Since 
Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished 
University Professor at Washington University in St. 
Louis. An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at a conference at the Center for the Study of 
American Business. 
then, the publications of the Office of 
Management and Budget have generally 
"adjusted" the Carter numbers upward for 
a change that it believes President Carter 
should have made-specifically providing 
for what is now considered to be an 
adequate national defense. That procedure Q) 
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Carter figures. The current Administration's 
much slower growth in civilian spending (ij I.. N t<') '<t 1/) \Q 
more than offsets its increases in defense u ell 00 00 00 00 00 .~ ~ 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 
outlays, but by about one half of the 1981 ~ 
tax cuts-about $350 billion versus over 
$700 billion for the five year period 1982-86. 
More sophisticated comparisons can be 
made. For example, the comparison can be 
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restated in terms of constant dollars, using 
in each case the inflation assumptions that 
accompanied the respective current dollar 
estimates. The results based on the GNP 
deflators are contained in Table 2. The 
differences between the two sets of 
projected outlays are very much smaller 
than in Table 1, about $23 billion when 
viewed in real (deflated) terms over the 
period 1982-86 (or a little less than $5 
billion a year). 
A variation of this theme is contained in 
Table 3, where the CPI assumptions are 
used to adjust both sets of outlay 
projections. In this case, the results are 
more ambiguous. Using the CPI as a 
deflator, the aggregate estimates for fiscal 
years 1982-1986 under the Reagan programs 
are shown on balance to be a bit higher 
than the Carter estimates-by about $7 
billion (or a little over $1 billion a year). 
In relation to the 1981 tax cuts, net 
spending reductions have been modest 
It does seem clear that, especially in 
relation to the 1981 tax cuts, the net 
spending reductions in the past 20 months 
are modest. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that current projections of the budget 
deficit for the next several years are 
unusually high. See Table 4 for estimates 
by the Congressional Budget Office that are 
in the neighborhood of $150 billion a year. 
Unofficial forecasts of the deficit in the 
next few years range up to $200 billion 
annually. 
The Problem of Entitlements 
When we probe beneath the aggregate 
spending levels, we find that "entitlements" 
or payments to individuals constitute the 
largest category of the budget. In recent 
years, entitlement payments also have been 
the most rapidly growing budget category. 
It therefore is quite appropriate that 
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TABLE 2 
Reagan and Carter Budget Estimates 
(Billions of Constant 1972 Dollars, 
Using GNP Deflators in Respective Documents) 
Amount 
Fiscal Year Carter Reagan Difference 
1982 $345.0 $354.9 $ +9.9 
1983 351.7 347.1 -4.6 
1984 355.4 347.7 -7.7 
1985 361.2 353.0 -8.2 
1986 368.8 356.1 -12.7 
TABLE 3 
Reagan and Carter Budget Estimates 
(Billions of Constant Dollars, 
Using CPI Deflators in Respective Documents) 
Amount 
Fiscal Year Carter Reagan Difference 
1982 $241.0 $253.5 $+ 12.5 
1983 245.0 247.4 +2.4 
1984 247.6 247.0 -0.6 
1985 251.7 250.0 -1.7 
1986 257.0 251.5 -5.5 
TABLE 4 
Projections of the Federal Budget 
(Fiscal Years, Billions of Dollars) 
1982 1983 
OMB CBO OMB CBO 
Outlays $731 $733 $762 $788 
Revenues 622 621 647 633 
Deficit 109 liT liS 15.5 
1984 1985 
OMB CBO OMB CBO 
Outlays $812 $844 $875 $910 
Revenues 720 692 801 757 
Deficit -w ---.s2 ~ ---rsT 
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increasing attention is being given to this 
area. I have little to add to the extensive 
public debate. I am, however, struck by the 
vast amount of ignorance attached to the 
largest entitlement, social security benefit 
payments. 
Given the current focus on reducing those 
outsized budget deficits, any discussion of 
possible change in social security outlays is 
immediately attacked as an effort to 
balance the budget on the backs of social 
security pensioners. It is true that facing 
the problem of social security financing 
would likely result in smaller budget 
deficits. But-and this fundamental point is 
usually ignored-even if the federal budget 
were in such great shape that we could 
declare dividends out of the surplus, we 
would still have to face the basic problem 
that the social security system is not 
adequately financed. 
We must face the basic problem 
that the Social Security system 
is not adequately financed 
Over the years, Congress has been more 
aggressive in voting benefit increases than 
in enacting the social security tax increases 
to pay for them. Also, demographic and 
economic trends have turned out in recent 
years to be more adverse than assumed in 
the system's actuarial calculations. Thus, the 
public debate on social security has the 
issue backwards: our attention is needed on 
the question of social security finance, not 
because of the budget deficits but to ensure 
that the program fully meets the disburse-
ments to which it is committed. We must 
recognize, however, that although it is the 
largest single "entitlement program," social 
security is only one of many. A comprehen-
sive budget restraint effort must take a 
hard look at the other components in this 
category, including veterans' pensions and 
government employees' retirement benefits. 
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The Question of National Defense Spending 
Let us turn to the second largest category 
of budget outlays, national defense. Here 
we should acknowledge at the outset that 
there is a broad-based agreement on the 
need to expand U.S. national defense 
spending. Both the Carter and Reagan 
budgets projected significant growth in 
defense spending in real terms for each of 
the five fiscal years 1982-1986. The Council 
of Economic Advisers (CEA) stated in its 
annual report accompanying the President's 
1982 Economic Report, "any economic 
effects ... must be assessed in the context of 
the overriding need for maintaining the 
level of defense spending necessary for 
national security." 
As would be expected, there has been 
considerable disagreement over the 
specifics of the buildup, including the 
question of how rapid an expansion in 
military spending is desirable. But it should 
be recognized that none of this is a debate 
between hawks and doves. Among the 
specific questions raised is the economic 
feasibility of the currently contemplated 
schedule of military outlays. Moreover, the 
The defense buildup is not a "hawk vs. dove" 
issue so much as it is a question of 
economic feasibility 
1981-82 recession has resulted in such 
substantial amounts of excess capacity in 
American industry that, at least for the next 
year or two, there is likely to be adequate 
capacity to meet military and civilian 
needs. But it is useful to look beyond, to 
the middle of the decade, when significant 
economic growth may coincide with the 
peak of the military buildup. In such 
circumstances, capacity questions would 
arise. The CEA annual report deals with 
that eventuality, pointing out three results 
of the defense buildup that can be 
anticipated: 
7 
1. The substantial transfer of resources 
in the durable goods sector to defense 
production may increase relative prices 
in some of the affected industries. 
Both the Department of Defense and 
private purchasers may have to pay 
more for goods from these industries. 
This premium is likely to increase with 
the size of the defense budget. 
2. Increased demand may produce delays 
in the delivery of military goods. 
Delivery timetables that seem realistic 
today may become obsolete as 
producers try to accommodate both 
the defense buildup and the expansion 
in civilian investment. 
3. Some crowding out of private 
investment may occur. Defense 
procurement uses many of the same 
physical resources needed for private 
investment, and the Defense Production 
Act gives defense priority in the 
market place. Some private firms may 
turn to foreign sources, while others 
may cancel or postpone plans for 
expansion. 
When we examine the details of the 
military budget, we find that the 
concentration of the planned military 
increases within procurement and research 
and development implies weapon 
production growth rates more rapid than 
those which occurred at the peak of the 
Vietnam buildup. Moreover, the present 
expansion occurs after a decade of steady 
reductions in the defense industrial base. 
A private economic consulting 
organization, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), 
pointed out: 
... the combination of the increasing 
defense shares and the acceleration 
in growth rates raises concerns 
about industrial capabilities and 
spillover impacts on the economy. 1 
DRI goes on to note that, with the 
implementation of significant investment 
8 
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programs in both plant and equipment and 
skilled labor forces, the problems of price 
pressures, bottlenecks and crowding out of 
civilian demand "could be constrained to 
isolated instances." See Table 5 for some 
examples of extremely rapid growth rates 
in future defense industry requirements. 
Over the six-year period 1982-87, double-
digit increases in annual output are shown 
for many industries, ranging from 
semiconductors to computers. The DRI 
conclusion is that the uncertainties about 
the capabilities of the defense industrial 
base and its linkages to other critical 
economic variables "will continue to cloud 
decisions regarding the defense budget." 
A more recent Data Resources report is 
even less sanguine, pointing out that, since 
1948, there has never before been a period 
of sustained growth in real defense 
spending such as that now planned. This 
more recent study concludes that the 
projected requirements for such large 
increases in defense output raise "obvious" 
questions about the ability of industry to 
meet them without adverse implications in 
terms of costs and leadtimes. 2 A variation 
of that theme appears in a recently released 
study by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
which reminds us that defense expenditures 
do not affect all industries equally, but 
have "highly concentrated industrial 
impacts."3 
Defense expenditures do not affect all 
industries equally; they have "highly 
concentrated industrial impacts" 
The Commerce Department examined a 
somewhat different time period than did 
DRI, but the conclusions are fairly similar. 
For most of the 58 major defense supplying 
industries which it studied, the Department 
of Commerce reported that existing capac-
ity plus planned increases are sufficient to 
supply the projected military and civilian 
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TABLE 5 
Projected Increases in Output in Major 
Defense Supplying Industries, 1982-1987 
Average annual real percentage growth 
in projected output 
Annual Increases 
In Total In Defense 
Output, Output, 
Industry 1982-87 1982-87 
Radio & TV communication 
equipment 11.2% 15.7% 
Aircraft 12.8 18.6 
Aircraft engines & parts 13.0 16.3 
Aircraft parts & equip., n.e.c. 11.2 14.7 
Complete guided missiles 11.5 15.2 
Electronic components, n.e.c. 11.2 17.2 
Tanks & components 22.6 27.1 
Ammunition, excluding 
small arms, n.e.c 15.0 15.2 
Motor vehicles parts 
and accessories 6.3 20.5 
Motor vehicles 6.7 27.8 
Other ordnance, accessories 13.5 14.4 
Communications, excluding 
radio and TV 6.9 10.3 
Semiconductors 13.7 20.2 
Miscellaneous machinery 6.9 15.3 
Electronic computing 
equipment 12.6 16.8 
Aluminum rolling & drawing 7.9 17.9 
Miscellaneous plastic 
products 8.5 17.3 
Primary aluminum 7.3 17.1 
Plastic materials & resins 8.8 17.8 
Special dies, tools & ace. 8.2 15.8 
Telephone & telegraph equip. 11.5 16.4 
Metal stampings 7.0 18.6 
Industrial trucks & tractors 9.9 14.1 
Machine tools, metal 
cutting 9.2 15.7 
Iron and steel foundries 4.3 13.2 
Source: Compiled from Data Resources, Inc. 
demands through 1985. However, the De-
partment said that, should further capacity 
expansion not take place in some of these 
industries, meeting projected 1985 re-
quirements would mean using outmoded, 
economically inefficient capacity, which 
would increase costs and prices. For exam-
ple, requirements for lead smelting and re-
fining are projected to rise by 12 percent 
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from 1979 to 1985, but economically effi-
cient capacity is estimated to decline by 4 
percent. Likewise, requirements for brass, 
bronze, and copper foundries are shown to 
increase by 32 percent, but economically ef-
ficient capacity is expected to rise by 25 
percent (see Table 6). How will all this 
balance out? 
The Commerce study reported that some 
of our basic metal processing industries 
will likely need to increase their dependence 
on foreign sources of supply in order to 
meet the stepped-up military demands. For 
example, the electrometallurgical products 
industry (which was specifically noted 
because of its "qualitative importance to 
Meeting 1985 defense requirements 
could mean using outmoded, 
inefficient capacity-thus increasing 
costs and prices 
defense") met 27.6 percent of its needs with 
imports in 1979. That key industry is ex-
pected to increase that dependency to 45 
percent in 1985. Likewise, zinc smelting and 
refining is anticipated to increase its import 
dependency from 33.4 percent in 1979 to 45 
percent in 1985. Imports of miscellaneous 
refined nonferrous metals are estimated to 
comprise 66 percent of the industry in 1985, 
compared to 55.7 percent in 1979 (see Table 
7). It is ironic to note the matter-of-fact way 
in which the Commerce Department reports 
such increased foreign dependence for some 
of the key defense-producing industries. On 
many other occasions, the hoary national 
security argument is trotted out to justify a 
host of subsidies to sectors of the economy 
far less closely related to defense output. 
The point of these data should not be mis-
understood. Drawing attention to the 
economic impacts of the contemplated ex-
pansion of military outlays does not call in 
question the desirablity of the expansion 
but, rather, its feasibility and cost in the 
11 
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TABLE 7 
Changing Import Dependence of Selected 
Defense Industries 
Industry 
Iron and ferroalloy 
ores mining 
Small arms 
Blast furnaces and 
steel mills 
Electrometallurgical 
products 
Lead smelting 
and refining 
Zinc smelting 
and refining 
Aluminum production 
and refining 
Refining of nonferrous 
metals, n.e.c. 
Machine tools, 
metal-cutting types 
Machine tools, 
metal-forming types 
Ball and roller 
bearings 
Instruments to measure 
electricity 
Semiconductors and 
related devices 
Electronic components, 
Imports as Percent 
of Total Supply 
1979 1985 est. 
25.0 28.1 
9.4 10.6 
10.1 13.0 
27.6 45.0 
8.8 11.0 
33.4 45.0 
8.9 10.0 
55.7 66.0 
17.2 23.0 
9.2 13.6 
10.5 14.0 
8.9 13.0 
20.6 30.0 
n.e.c. 8.0 11.5 
Optical instruments 
and lenses 14.1 19.5 
Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Industrial 
Economics 
period contemplated. An implicit assumption 
arises from these concerns: any adjustment 
of scheduled defense outlays to conform 
more closely with expected domestic produc-
tion capabilities would result in slowing 
down the rate of increase in defense spend-
ing in the next few years and thus lower the 
projected deficits of the federal government. 
Adjusting defense outlays in the next 
few years to conform with production 
capacity would lower the federal 
government's projected deficits 
13 
Conclusions 
In responding to the concerns over the con-
tinuing large federal deficits projected for 
the next several years, I have emphasized the 
desirability of another hard look at the 
spending side of the budget. Unlike another 
round of tax increases, restraining govern-
ment expenditures is entirely consistent 
with the efforts of President Reagan to 
strengthen the private sector by reducing 
the size of government. 
Three major areas of the budget appear 
to be promising candidates for further 
pruning of outlays-above and beyond the 
Administration's important efforts to ferret 
out low priority items and to curb waste: 
1. The so-called entitlements. These open-
ended commitments on the budget 
range from social security and medi-
care to medicaid, welfare, veterans' 
pensions, and the retirement systems 
for federal employees, military and 
civilian. In the short run, reductions 
could be made in the generous for-
mulas for computing annual cost-of-
living increases (the COLA clauses) 
contained in many of these programs. 
More fundamental changes probably 
will not be made until the public 
recognizes the extent to which these 
"social insurance" programs have 
taken on a subsidy or welfare 
aspect-e.g., providing benefits far 
more generous than those that would 
result from basing the payments solely 
on employee/employer contributions 
plus earnings on those contributions. 
Making benefits subject to income 
taxes-as is now done with private 
retirement benefits-would reduce the 
net subsidy payment, especially to 
those taxpayers with substantial 
amounts of other income. 
2. The defense budget. Official projec-
tions of future military outlays, in real 
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terms, have risen successively during 
the last two years from 5% to 7% to 
9% or more per annum. I find little 
justification offered of the economic 
feasibility of this sharply upward 
movement. A tough-minded attitude 
should be taken to the military budget, 
comparable to the treatment of many 
civilian spending activities of the 
federal government. Reducing the ex-
tent of cost overruns and bottlenecks 
A tough-minded attitude should be 
taken to the military budget, 
comparable to the treatment of many 
civilian spending activities 
in defense production will help to 
maintain the necessary support for the 
strengthened national defense that is 
needed in the dangerous world in 
which we live. 
Because of the potential capacity 
problems, a given cutback in nominal 
military spending would actually 
result in less than a proportional re-
duction in real procurement outlays. 
This would come about because of re-
duced price pressures on military pur-
chasing generally. 
3. Imbedded subsidies. Advocates of 
smaller federal budgets typically focus 
on entitlements and/or defense spend-
ing because these are the two largest 
categories. However, it does not take a 
great deal of research to discover a 
third category of the budget, "all 
other." Contrary to widespread belief, 
not all of the i terns in this part of the 
budget are social programs, nor have 
they been cut to the bone. Generous 
programs such as subsidies to dairy 
and tobacco farmers and sugar pro-
ducers quickly come to mind. There is 
no serious justification for these sub-
sidies and many others like them in 
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other departments of the federal gov-
ernment. Such special benefits to spe-
cific segments of the society are in the 
budget simply because of the political 
muscle of the producer or other spe-
cial interest groups supporting them. 
The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared several comprehensive 
listings of potential budget cuts that 
could be made. There is no shortage of 
information. All that is lacking is the 
will to cut more. 
On reflection, we need to realize that at 
times-such as earlier this year-the failure 
to curtail federal spending leads to pres-
sures for tax increases. Given the outlook 
for rising deficit financing, if we are to 
avoid further reversals of the 1981 tax cuts, 
more of the existing sacred cows in the 
federal budget should be taken out of pas-
ture and led to slaughter. 
More of the existing sacred cows 
in the federal budget 
should be taken out of pasture 
and led to slaughter 
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